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ployees and officials.' 8 Also, some have speculated that the overthrow
of the doctrine would result in a substantial saving of time and money
by eliminating the necessity of litigants debating whether the municipal act in question is immune from liability,' 9 and that litigation
would actually be lessened by the absence of the "governmental2°
proprietary" distinction which has been so difficult to apply.
The tenacity of the courts in adhering to the doctrine of municipal
tort immunity is at least partially attributable to their allegiance to
the doctrine of stare decisis. Although stare decisis is entitled to deference, when a rule of law is fallacious and unjust, it should be
discarded.
One of the most controversial aspects of the Haney case is that
the court chose to apply the decision retroactively in all actions not
barred by the statute of limitations. At least two other courts which
have overthrown the immunity have applied their decisions retroactively. 2'1 This retroactive application is not likely to be too onerous,
as the statute of limitations in Kentucky for many tort actions is one
22
year, and five years is ostensibly the longest period allowed in tort.
Edwin Abell
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As A TEam.-During his lifetime, the now deceased father bought a
number of Series E, United States Savings Bonds issued pursuant to
31 U.S.C.A. section 757(c). These were issued in his name jointly
with either one or the other of two sons, with the exception of a bond
issued solely in the name of one son. Subsequent to the purchase of
the bonds, the father married for the second time. Upon the authority
of Henderson's Arnr v. Bewley,' the circuit court, in a declaratory
judgment, determined that all of the bonds passed as intestate property, the disposition of which was to be governed by the laws of
descent and distribution. Held: Reversed. The Treasury Department
Regulations are a part of the government contract, and under those
regulations "if either co-owner dies without the bond having been
18 Fuller &Casner, supra note 11, at 460; Borchard, supra note 1, at 134.
19
2 Fuller & Casner, supra note 11, at 462.
o Doddridge, Distinction Between Governmental and Proprietary Functions
of Municipal Corporations,28 Mich. L. Rev. 325 (1925).
21 Stone v. Arizona Highway Conmm'n, 93 Ariz. 384, 881 P.2d 107 (1963);
Muskopf
v. Coming Hospital Dist., 55 Cal. 2d 21, 359 P.2d 457 (1961).
22
Ky. Rev. Stat. cl. 413.
1264 S.W.2d 680 (Ky. 1953).
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presented and surrendered for payment or authorized reissue, the
survivor will be recognized as the sole and absolute owner."2 Marcum
v. Marcum, 877 S.W.2d 62 (Ky. 1964).
There are two distinct legal theories with respect to rights in
United States Savings Bonds issued in the names of two individuals
in the alternative, upon the death of one of the individuals. "The
rule followed by a majority of the courts, frequently called the 'majority rule,'... is that the surviving co-owner is vested with the sole
ownership in such bonds ... .- There is a joint tenancy, and upon
the death of one of the co-owners, the bonds belong exclusively to the
survivor by right of survivorship. 4 This rule is qualified by the words,
"at least in the absence of fraud or other inequitable conduct on the
part of the survivor."5
The majority rule is based on the theory that this is a question
of property rights under a contract and not one of gift.6 The Treasury Regulations, having the force and effect of law, form a part of
the bond contract between the United States and the individual under
the well-established doctrine that the laws effective at the time of
the making of the contract form a part of it whether expressly referred to in the agreement or not.7 The contract may then be enforced
as a contract for the benefit of a third party.8 The issuance of savings
bonds being a proper exercise of the federal government's power to
borrow money, the federal statutes are supreme under article 6, clause
2 of the federal constitution, and any state law or policy in conflict
therewith must give way. 9
The minority view is that the Treasury Regulations:
merely provide a convenient method of payment thereof to discharge the
government's obligation in that respect. Accordingly, upon the death
of one of the co-owners, the rights of the survivor as against the estate

of the deceased co-owner or claimants to the interest of the decedent
are governed primarily by the source of the funds used to purchase
2 31 C.F.R. § 315.61.
3

Annot., 37 A.L.R.2d 1221 (1954).
4 Hill v. Havens, 242 Iowa 920, 48 N.W.2d 870 (1951).

5 Annot., supra note 3. It was argued in Marcumn v. Marcum 377 S.W.2d
62 (Ky. 1964) that designation by the father of his sons of a former marriage
constituted a constructive fraud on the marital rights of his surviving widow,
but this argument received no mention in the opinion handed down by the
court. This was probably because the bonds were purchased prior to the second
marriage at a time when the father was living with his children without paying

for any board or lodging.
6 Ervin v. Connecticut, 225 N.C. 267, 34 S.E.2d 402 (1945).
7 Stephens v. First National Bank, 65 Nev. 352, 196 P.2d 756 (1948).

8 Conrad v. Conrad, 66 Cal. App. 2d 280, 152 P.2d 221 (Dist. Ct. App. 1944).

9 Free v. Bland, 369 U.S. 663 (1962). This would apparently solve any
problem arising in a jurisdiction where third party beneficiary contracts are not
recognized.
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and by the application of state law as to devolution of propthe bonds
10
erty.

In the Marcum" case, the Kentucky Court of Appeals accepted
the majority view by holding that the issuance of a United States
Savings Bond naming the buyer of the bond and another as co-owners
is a third party beneficiary contract incorporating the Treasury Regulations. In doing so, the court expressly overruled Henderson's Adm'r
v. Bewley.12 But the overruling of the Henderson case does not leave
it void of legal significance. Even though there may no longer be a
gift inter vivos or a gift causa mortis13 of savings bonds, an attempt to
defeat a spouse's marital rights will result in the court declaring a
14
constructive trust in favor of the surviving spouse.
The decision is undeniably correct in view of the recent Supreme
Court case of Free v. Bland15 holding that a Texas law which required
a husband to reimburse his deceased wife's estate, upon the taking of
bonds bought with community funds in the name of the husband or
wife, must yield to the federal law expressed in Treasury Regulations
conferring right of survivorship. The Marcum case appears to be a
logical extension of the Kentucky case of Moore's Adri v. Marshall',
where a bond issued in the name of one person only was held not to
be the proper subject of an inter vivos transfer.
R. Cletus Maricle
10 Annot., supra note 3, at 1233.

11377 S.W.2d 62 (Ky. 1964).
12 264 S.W.2d 680 (Ky. 1953).
13 Henderson's Adm'r v. Bewley, 264 S.W.2d 680 (Ky. 1953), concerned what
the court thought was an attempted gift causa mortis which failed for lack of
delivery. The Marcum case held that this was entirely a question of contract
and not of gift.
14 Henaerson Adm'r v. Bewley, 264 S.W.2d 680 (Ky. 1953).
15369 U.S. 663 (1962).
16 302 Ky. 729, 196 S.W.2d 369 (1946).

